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 16.  international antitrust cooperation and 
the preference for nonbinding regimes 
 anu  bradford  *  
 introduction 
 Today, multinational corporations operate in increasingly international markets, 
yet antitrust laws regulating their competitive conduct remain national. Thus, 
corporations are subject to divergent antitrust regimes across the various juris-
dictions in which they operate. This increases transaction costs, causes unneces-
sary delays, and raises the likelihood of confl icting decisions. The risks inherent 
in multi-jurisdictional regulatory review were prominently illustrated in the pro-
posed  GE/Honeywell acquisition, which failed following the European Union’s 
(“EU”) decision to prohibit the transaction despite its earlier approval in the 
United States. 1 Inconsistent remedies imposed on Microsoft following parallel 
investigations by both the U.S. and EU authorities serve as another example of 
the regulatory burdens companies face when dealing with multiple antitrust 
investigations. 
 Some commentators believe that inconsistent antitrust decisions refl ect pro-
tectionism. The EU’s negative  GE/Honeywell decision, for instance, was alleged 
to be motivated by the EU’s desire to protect GE/Honeywell’s European rivals. 2 
Others, including myself, have argued that protectionism motivates U.S. and EU 
antitrust enforcement only in the margins, and that the rare enforcement con-
fl icts are better explained by the existing differences in the goals and analytical 
*  Assistant Professor, The University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Travis 
Bradford, Rachel Brewster, Rosalind Dixon, Einer Elhauge, Jack Goldsmith, Katerina 
Linos, Eric Posner, and Joel Trachtman for their helpful suggestions on the earlier drafts 
of this article. 
1. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in 
Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001),  available at  http://www.
usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8140.htm (last visited May 24, 2010); 
Commission Decision No. 2004/134/EEC, O.J. L 48/1 (2004). 
2.  William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,  Conglomerate Mergers and 
Range Effects: It’s a Long Way from Chicago to Brussels , Address at the George Mason 
University Symposium (Nov. 9, 2001),  available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
speeches/9536.htm (last visited May 24, 2010). 
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foundations of antitrust law in the United States and the EU. 3 Thus, whether the 
EU’s  GE/Honeywell decision is a manifestation of the EU’s protectionism or an 
indication of legitimate differences in the U.S. and EU’s antitrust thinking is 
debatable. 
 When antitrust authorities in a given jurisdiction evaluate a merger, they ana-
lyze whether the merger increases or diminishes competition in their domestic 
market. Effi ciency gains or competitive harm outside the home market are irrel-
evant. Domestic antitrust laws strive to advance domestic consumer welfare, not 
global welfare. When evaluating the proposed GE/Honeywell merger, for 
instance, the EU antitrust authorities did not consider whether the merger’s pos-
sible effi ciencies in the United States would offset its alleged competitive harm 
within the EU. Similarly, the U.S. antitrust authorities focused on the transac-
tion’s consumer welfare effects within the United States, ignoring the effects in 
the EU. By internalizing only the domestic costs and benefi ts of a merger and 
externalizing its foreign effects, national antitrust authorities act within the legit-
imate boundaries of their domestic antitrust laws. This, however, can lead to a 
situation whereby a merger that would enhance global welfare is prohibited 
because the consumer harm it creates in a particular jurisdiction is not offset by 
effi ciencies in that same jurisdiction. 
 The end result of the multi-jurisdictional antitrust enforcement is that the 
most stringent antitrust jurisdiction always prevails. If the United States wants 
to adopt a permissive antitrust policy (e.g., approve the GE/Honeywell merger) 
and the EU an interventionist policy (e.g., prohibit the GE/Honeywell merger), 
the EU antitrust policy prevails: the GE/Honeywell transaction is banned. Had 
GE/Honeywell been able to withdraw from the EU market altogether, it could 
have avoided EU antitrust review and proceeded with the merger. This, natu-
rally, was not an option, given the importance of the EU market for the merging 
parties. The  GE/Honeywell case illustrates how the EU becomes the de facto 
global antitrust regulator by choosing stringent enforcement policies. 
 Purely domestic antitrust laws fail to effi ciently control cross-border transac-
tions and anticompetitive practices spanning across global markets. Consequently, 
demands for establishing a comprehensive international antitrust regime have 
increased. 4 Those fearing antitrust protectionism argue that an international 
3.  See generally Anu Bradford,  International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of 
the WTO , 48  Harv. Int’l L.J. 383 (2007). 
4.  See, e.g., Andrew Guzman,  The Case for International Antitrust ,  in  Competition Laws 
in Confl ict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global Economy 99 (Richard A. Epstein 
R. & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004); Eleanor M. Fox,  Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: 
Races Up, Down, and Sideways , 75  N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1781 (2000);  Philip Marsden, 
Competition Policy for the WTO (2003); Leon Brittan,  A Framework for International 
Competition , Address at World Competition Forum (Feb. 3, 1992),  reprinted in 3  Int’l 
Econ. Insights 21 (1992); WTO Competition Working Group,  Communication by the 
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antitrust regime could restrain and punish such protectionist impulses. Others 
support international antitrust cooperation on the grounds that it could mitigate 
coordination problems, reduce transaction costs, and prevent enforcement con-
fl icts by enhancing convergence across jurisdictions. 
 International antitrust regime, properly designed, can diminish the various 
problems associated with decentralized antitrust enforcement. However, while 
the need for enhanced international antitrust cooperation is generally recog-
nized, there is little consensus on the precise content of such cooperation. A 
group of scholars and some states, including the EU, hold that a legally binding 
international antitrust agreement ought to be established, perhaps by extending 
the coverage of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) to antitrust law. 5 Others 
fi nd a binding international agreement politically infeasible or normatively 
undesirable. 6 The United States, for instance, is skeptical of a WTO antitrust 
agreement and calls instead for enhanced voluntary cooperation. 
 This article focuses on the relative merits of binding and nonbinding interna-
tional antitrust cooperation. It argues that the primary impediment to interna-
tional antitrust cooperation is the disagreement over the substance and 
institutional form of such cooperation. This disagreement has led states to water 
down the proposed binding international antitrust agreement to the point of 
severely limiting, if not eliminating, any net benefi ts. In the end, states have 
chosen not to spend resources and political capital in negotiating a binding inter-
national agreement that fails to generate substantial benefi ts, preferring to 
resolve their differences informally on a case-by-case basis. 
 Irrespective of its normative merits, a binding international antitrust agree-
ment is currently not feasible to negotiate. Yet states do not resort to nonbinding 
antitrust cooperation as a “second-best” solution to capture limited gains when 
their fi rst-best regime choice is unavailable. Nonbinding international antitrust 
European Community and its Member States , WT/WGTCP/W/62, at 12–13 (Mar. 5, 1998); 
Munich Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, 5  World Trade Materials 
126 (Sept. 1993),  reprinted in 64  Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Special Supp. (July 
10, 1993); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,  Competition-Oriented Reforms of the WTO World Trade 
System-Proposals and Trade Options ,  in  Towards WTO Competition Rules 43, 48–49 
(Roger Zäch ed., 1999); Robert D. Anderson & Peter Holmes,  Competition Policy and the 
Future of the Multilateral Trading System , 5  J. Int’l Econ. L. 531 (2002). 
5.  See, e.g., Guzman,  supra note 4.  See also Julian L. Clarke & Simon J. Evenett, 
A Multilateral Framework for Competition Policy? in  The Singapore Issues and the 
World Trading System (Simon J. Evenett ed., 2003) (providing a good overview of the 
various proposals for including antitrust in the WTO);  Marsden ,  supra note 4. 
6.  See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan,  Against International Cooperation, in  Competition Laws 
in Confl ict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global Economy ,  supra note 4, at 66; 
Diane P. Wood,  Cooperation and Convergence in International Antitrust: Why the Light Is 
Still Yellow? ,  in  Competition Laws in Confl ict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global 
Economy ,  supra note 4, at 177. 
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cooperation remains preferable even if a binding agreement later becomes fea-
sible. Given the nature of the collective action problem in international antitrust 
cooperation, binding agreements and formal institutions remain largely unnec-
essary and undesirable. Thus, this article rebuts the presumed supremacy of a 
binding international antitrust regime and claims that nonbinding cooperation 
offers a better path for international antitrust convergence for now and in the 
foreseeable future. 
 Part I below briefl y reviews the nonbinding international antitrust regime 
that has emerged in the absence of a binding international antitrust agreement. 
Part II explains why negotiating binding international antitrust cooperation has 
been diffi cult and why such negotiation would yield limited benefi ts for states. 
Part III discusses why nonbinding cooperation is more likely to foster interna-
tional antitrust convergence. Part IV explains why nonbinding cooperation is 
likely to persist even if the negotiation of a binding international antitrust agree-
ment were to become viable in the future. 
 i .  the emergence of a nonbinding international 
antitrust regime 
 States have attempted to launch WTO antitrust negotiations on several occa-
sions. 7 However, all attempts to negotiate a binding international antitrust agree-
ment have thus far failed, 8 prompting states to engage in voluntary cooperation 
instead. 9 Over the past decade, states have concluded a number of bilateral 
7.  See, e.g.,  Marsden ,  supra note 4, at ch. 1;  see also Nataliya Yacheistova,  The International 
Competition Regulation — A Short Review of a Long Evolution , 18  World Competition, Law 
and Econ. 99, 99–110 (1994). 
8.  Most recently, the WTO negotiations on antitrust were stalled in Cancun in 2003 
due to the resistance of the developing countries.  See, e.g., Day  5: Conference ends without 
consensus , available at  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/
min03_14sept_e.htm (last visited May 24, 2010). On August 1, 2004, the WTO General 
Council decided to offi cially drop antitrust policy from the Doha Round negotiation 
agenda (“July decision”).  See WTO General Council,  Decision Adopted by the General 
Council , WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
9.  See generally Oliver Budzinski,  The International Competition Network: Prospects and 
Limits on the Road towards International Competition Governance, 8  Comp. & Change 
223–42 (2004); Frederic Jenny,  International Cooperation on Competition: Myth, Reality and 
Perspective, 48  Antitrust Bull . 973–1003 (2003); Anu Piilola,  Assessing Theories of Global 
Governance: A Case Study of International Antitrust Regulation , 39  Stan. J. Int’l L. 207 
(2003). 
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agreements and engaged in active nonbinding multilateral cooperation in order 
to promote convergence and reduce enforcement confl icts. 10 
 Bilateral cooperation occurs on a case-by-case basis. Antitrust authorities 
exchange nonconfi dential market information, assist each other in evidence 
gathering, coordinate investigations, and negotiate joint remedies. 11 The primary 
challenge for the case-by-case cooperation is the agencies’ inability to exchange 
confi dential business information absent a waiver from the relevant corpora-
tions. For this reason, enforcement cooperation tends to be more successful in 
merger control investigations than in cartel investigations. Corporations seeking 
to merge often have an incentive to grant a waiver in order to ensure a swift 
investigation and, consequently, timely consummation of their transaction. In 
contrast, corporations remain reluctant to facilitate agencies’ joint cartel investi-
gations, as consenting to the exchange of confi dential information would expose 
them to additional sanctions in another jurisdiction. 12 
 Bilateral cooperation has been particularly successful between the United 
States and the EU. 13 Frequent interactions between the two antitrust regimes 
have resulted in signifi cant convergence in their antitrust analysis and enforce-
ment practices. And while intense cooperation does not guarantee identical deci-
sions, as the controversial GE/Honeywell merger demonstrated, 14 enforcement 
10.  These cooperation arrangements have been extensively described elsewhere in the 
literature,  See, e.g., Bruno Zanetti,  Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the 
International Level (2002);  see also Jenny , supra note 9; Budzinski,  supra note 9. 
11.  Even though states have concluded formal bilateral agreements, the decision on 
whether to cooperate remains entirely at the discretion of domestic antitrust authorities. 
Thus, this form of cooperation is more aptly characterized as nonbinding rather than 
binding. 
12.  Id. Jenny ,  supra note 9 . at 995.  See also International Chamber of Commerce & 
Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD,  ICC/BIAC Comments on Report 
of the U.S. International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) 8 (June 5, 2000), 
 available at  http://www.biac.org/statements/comp/00-06-ICC-BIAC_comments_on_
ICPAC_report.pdf [hereinafter  ICC/BIAC Comments on Report of the U.S. International 
Competition Policy Advisory Committee ]. 
13.  See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of the Competition 
Law, U.S.–E.C., Sept. 23, 1991, U.S. State Dep’t No. 91-216, 30 I.L.M. 1487, 1991 WL 
495155; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
European Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the 
Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, art. III, U.S.–E.C., June 4, 1998, U.S. State Dep’t 
No. 98-106, 1998 WL 428268.  See also Press Release, US–EU Merger Working Group, Best 
Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations (Oct. 30, 2002),  available at  http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/200405.pdf (last visited May 24, 2010). 
14.  See supra note 1. 
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confl icts between the two agencies are rare in practice. 15 In contrast, cooperation 
is less frequent between developed countries and developing countries. 16 This 
might be because developed countries have less to gain from such cooperation. 
Developed countries would likely be exposed to numerous requests of enforce-
ment assistance from developing countries, as large developed country corpora-
tions often achieve a high market share in small developing country markets. In 
contrast, smaller developing-country corporations rarely trigger an antitrust 
investigation in large developed-country markets. 17 
 Bilateral antitrust cooperation offers only a partial solution for achieving 
greater coherence across antitrust jurisdictions. Multilateral institutions have 
complemented the efforts to foster international antitrust cooperation. Since 
2001, the most active forum for nonbinding multilateral antitrust cooperation 
has been the International Competition Network (“ICN”). The ICN is an infor-
mal network of antitrust agencies, which seeks to enhance cooperation among 
the world’s antitrust authorities and promote substantive and procedural conver-
gence of antitrust policies on a voluntary basis. 18 The ICN identifi es, develops, 
and publishes policy recommendations and best practices. 19 Such voluntary 
norms are aimed at enhancing policy convergence, reducing transaction costs, 
and catalyzing and guiding domestic reforms. The ICN, together with other 
international institutions, also offers technical assistance to developing coun-
tries with the view of strengthening antitrust advocacy, building institutional 
capacity, and supporting market reforms in those countries. 20 Following the col-
lapse of the WTO antitrust negotiations in 2003, the ICN remains the most infl u-
ential international regime facilitating multilateral antitrust cooperation today. 
15.  The  GE/Honeywell decision remains the only merger case in which the U.S. and 
EU authorities have reached a confl icting decision. The EU also prohibited a proposed 
merger between DeHavilland and ATR, which was approved by the Canadian authorities. 
( See Commission Decision, Case No. IV/M.053 of October 2, 1991, Aerospatiale-Alenia/
de Havilland). Legal uncertainty resulting from multi-jurisdictional merger review is thus 
unlikely to form as signifi cant of a negative externality as one might imagine. It is, how-
ever, diffi cult to evaluate the costs of the prospect — no matter how unlikely in practice —
 that any given merger has a higher risk of being prohibited when it must survive multiple 
regulatory reviews. 
16.  See Jenny,  supra note 9, at 993, 979. 
17.  Developed countries are also more often than developing countries able to extend 
their domestic antitrust laws to regulate the conduct of foreign corporations, further 
diminishing their need to rely on enforcement assistance. Besides, developed countries 
might assume that their requests for assistance would never be met in practice due to the 
limited resources of the developing country antitrust agencies. 
18.  For more information on the purpose and the functioning of the ICN, see  www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org (last visited May 24, 2010). 
19.  See Budzinski,  supra note 9, at 228. 
20.  See, e.g., Jenny,  supra note 9, at 976–77. 
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 ii.  the limited gains of a binding international antitrust 
agreement 
 A.  How States’ Divergent Preferences and Capacities Obstruct Cooperation 
 States agree that competitive markets and antitrust laws are benefi cial. However, 
they disagree on the particular goals and priorities of antitrust enforcement. 
States also acknowledge the necessity to coordinate antitrust enforcement across 
jurisdictions but fail to agree on the specifi cs. These confl icting views on a glob-
ally optimal antitrust regime amount to a distributional confl ict. A distributional 
confl ict arises when the costs and the benefi ts of an international antitrust agree-
ment are unevenly distributed among states, and when states therefore cannot 
agree on the focal point of coordination. 21 
 The long-standing distributional confl ict between the United States and the 
EU is one of the principal impediments for a binding international antitrust 
agreement. Both the United States and the EU acknowledge the effi ciencies that 
international antitrust cooperation could generate, but disagree as to the optimal 
content, the legal form, and the institutional framework of cooperation. 22 
 The U.S.-EU disagreement stems from some key differences that persist 
between the United States and the EU despite the increasing alignment of their 
antitrust laws over the last decade. 23 The United States and the EU agree that 
antitrust laws seek to maximize consumer welfare. However, social consider-
ations, such as promotion of employment or protection of small enterprises, still 
play a role at the margins of the EU antitrust analysis. The EU also employs its 
antitrust laws to further European integration. Antitrust laws ensure that anti-
competitive practices of private enterprise do not frustrate the efforts to remove 
trade barriers within the EU. This market integration goal has led to a more 
interventionist enforcement policy vis-à-vis vertical agreements, in particular ter-
ritorial restraints that threaten to partition the common market. The EU is also 
more skeptical of market power and has a lower threshold in bringing cases 
against dominant companies ( see decisions against Microsoft and Intel). 
Similarly, the EU has also historically taken a harsher view towards vertical 
and conglomerate mergers ( see GE/Honeywell). While there is increasing con-
vergence between the two key antitrust jurisdictions today, these remaining 
21.  Generally, confl icting state preferences regarding international cooperation on any 
given issue emanate from many different factors, such as economic disparities, diverse 
development priorities and market structures, dissimilar enforcement capacities, differ-
ent legal traditions, and the distinct domestic political equilibrium within each state. 
22.  See Bradford,  supra note 3, at 522–26 (exploring reasons for the divergence of views 
between the United States and the EU regarding international antitrust cooperation). 
23.  See  Einer Elhauge & Damien Geradin, Global Antitrust Law and Economics 
1100, 1100 ( 2007). 
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differences have led the United States and the EU to endorse international con-
vergence each toward their respective antitrust laws. 24 
 The United States and the EU also disagree on the optimal institutional 
framework for antitrust cooperation. The EU supports a binding WTO antitrust 
agreement. This is consistent with the EU’s view that antitrust and trade policies 
are intrinsically linked. The United States, on the other hand, fears that antitrust 
would lose its exclusive focus on consumer welfare when enmeshed with trade 
policy considerations in the WTO. Instead, the United States has promoted anti-
trust cooperation within the ICN, which allows antitrust enforcers to cooperate 
without interference from the trade community. 
 In addition to the U.S.-EU controversy, disagreement between developed 
countries and developing countries regarding the content and the costs of a pro-
spective antitrust agreement has obstructed cooperation efforts. 25 Developed 
countries want to “level the playing fi eld” by enhancing multinational corpora-
tions’ (“MNCs”) access to the developing-country markets. Developed countries 
also seek to reduce transaction costs involved in MNCs’ cross-border business 
transactions. 26 In contrast, developing countries are concerned about their inabil-
ity to control the anticompetitive conduct of MNCs in their markets. 27 Developing 
countries also resist the idea of a level playing fi eld, maintaining that they need 
to be able to shield their small domestic corporations from larger MNCs. 
Developing countries struggling with capacity constraints have also opposed 
WTO antitrust agreement because of the regulatory burden that new interna-
tional obligations would impose on them. 28 
 Consequently, a critical impediment to antitrust cooperation is the diffi culty 
of overcoming the distributional confl ict between the United States and the EU 
24.  See, e.g., Fox,  supra note 4, at 1799 (explaining how the United States and the EU 
have actively been exporting their own antitrust laws to developing countries and transi-
tion economies in the recent decade in an attempt to expand their preferred regulatory 
regimes). 
25.  Bradford,  supra note 3, at 526–28, 534–37. 
26.  Bernard M. Hoekman & Kamal Saggi,  International Cooperation on Domestic 
Policies: Lessons from the WTO Competition Policy Debate ,  in  Economic Development and 
Multilateral Trade Cooperation 439, 446 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman 
eds., 2006). 
27.  Ajit Singh & Rahule Dhumale,  Competition Policy, Development, and Developing 
Countries ,  in  What Global Economic Crisis? 122, 127 ( Philip Arestis, Michelle Baddeley, 
& John McCombie eds., 2001). Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to inter-
national cartel activity, because their nonexistent or weak antitrust enforcers are unable to 
prosecute the threat effectively.  See Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow,  Contemporary 
International Cartels and Developing Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for 
Competition Policy , 71  Antitrust L.J. 801, 801–03 (2004). 
28.  See discussion  infra Part II.C (explaining why an international antitrust agreement 
would impose high compliance costs). 
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on one hand, and the developed countries and the developing countries on the 
other. These distributional tensions have narrowed the scope for any feasible 
international agreement. 
 B . How the Distributional Confl icts Would Lead to a Shallow Agreement 
 Distributional confl icts force states to negotiate compromises that lead to shal-
low international obligations. A shallow international antitrust agreement would 
likely exclude all areas of disagreement. The disagreement between the United 
States and the EU would prevent the inclusion of rules on unilateral conduct by 
monopolies, vertical and conglomerate mergers, and on vertical territorial 
restraints. These are the key areas where the U.S. and the EU antitrust thinking 
differ. 29 The United States would also likely oppose rules banning export cartels, 
given that it remains the only country that continues to use such exemptions to 
its domestic antitrust laws widely. 30 Developing countries would also demand 
signifi cant exceptions to any obligations subjecting their local fi rms to interna-
tional competition. 31 However, meaningful rules might be diffi cult to negotiate, 
even with respect to issues where broad consensus exists. For instance, all states 
agree that hard-core cartels are anticompetitive. Yet a commitment to prohibit 
such cartels would be diffi cult to agree on in the absence of a consensus regard-
ing the defi nition of a hard-core cartel or appropriate sanctions that should 
apply. 32 
 The United States has objected to the WTO antitrust agreement precisely on 
these grounds. It has argued that a binding international agreement would 
weaken antitrust laws throughout the world. Given the confl icting regulatory 
priorities, states could only reach a watered-down compromise. 33 At worst, the 
prospective antitrust agreement would only codify the lowest common denomi-
nator among the broad WTO membership. 34 
29.  See  Elhauge & Geradin,  supra note 23, at  1100 ( 2007). 
30.  For example, the United States has defended domestic rules that permit the exemp-
tion of export cartels before the WTO in 2003 by arguing that these exemptions “were 
conceived as mechanisms for domestic entities that lacked the resources to engage in 
effective export activity acting individually.”  See WTO Working Group on the Interaction 
between Trade and Competition Policy,  Note by the Secretariat: Report on the Meeting of 
February 20–21, 2003, 37, WT/WGTCP/M/21 (May 26, 2003). 
31.  Singh & Dhumale,  supra note 27, at  127 . 
32.  The United States, for instance, applies criminal sanctions and treble damages to 
antitrust violations, whereas the EC competition provisions limit remedies to administra-
tive fi nes. 
33.  Wood,  supra note 6, at 186. 
34.  See Roscoe B. Starek, III, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, International 
Aspects of Antitrust Enforcement, Address at the Antitrust 1996 Conference (Sept. 29, 
1995),  available at  http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/starek/starekda.htm (“The sticking point 
is whether agreement can be reached on a suffi ciently stringent set of antitrust policies. 
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 As the United States predicted, the proposed antitrust agreement within the 
WTO grew weaker with every new attempt to agree on the negotiation mandate. 
In the end, states were forced to strip the agreement of any meaningful content 
in an effort to accommodate their divergent preferences. The most recent pro-
posal for a WTO antitrust agreement forwent substantive antitrust rules alto-
gether, proposing merely to extend the fundamental yet vague WTO principles 
of “transparency” or “national treatment” to antitrust matters. Such an agree-
ment would accomplish little in terms of fostering international convergence 
and would leave states with limited benefi ts to offset the costs of negotiating the 
agreement. 35 
 Some might argue that even weak antitrust commitments could deepen with 
time due to the gradual alignment of states’ preferences and alleviation of uncer-
tainties surrounding cooperation. 36 As states learn more about the effects of 
the agreement and gradually reach a consensus on a wider set of issues, they 
may incrementally adopt deeper obligations. However, even if states were will-
ing to gradually expand their obligations, the WTO — the most likely venue for a 
binding international agreement — would not lend itself well to frequent revi-
sions of obligations. New, deeper commitments would call for new negotiations, 
which are slow, cumbersome, and costly. Consequently, states are more likely 
to resort to the WTO when they are able to agree on meaningful substantive 
norms at the outset. When the necessary consensus is missing, however, non-
binding agreements outside the WTO are more likely to accomplish effective 
cooperation. 
It is the fear of a “lowest-common-denominator” antitrust code that has made many 
American policymakers skeptical about pursuing a world code”);  see also A. Douglas 
Melamed , Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust 
Enforcement in the Global Economy, Address at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
25th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 22, 1998),  avail-
able at  http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2043.htm (“[A]ny WTO rules would 
be lowest-common-denominator rules that would merely serve to justify weak national 
antitrust enforcement. Third, such lowest-common-denominator rules would serve little 
purpose”). 
35.  Bernard M. Hoekman & Michel M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the 
World Trading System 133–34 (2d ed. 2001). 
36.  This argument is advanced in particular by the “transformational approach.” 
Transformationalists endorse shallow framework agreements with broadest possible par-
ticipation and claim that commitments that are that initially shallow deepen with time. 
For a discussion and critique of transformationalism, see George W. Downs et al.,  The 
 Transformational Model of International Regime  Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience? ,  38 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 465 (2000) [hereinafter Downs et al.,  Transformational Model ]. 
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 C . How a Shallow Agreement Would Offer Limited Net Gains 
 A shallow WTO antitrust agreement mitigates distributional tensions. However, 
diluting the substance of the agreement simultaneously lowers its expected ben-
efi ts. Thus, if an agreement becomes too shallow, it is no longer worth negotiat-
ing, because states do not gain any net benefi ts to offset the costs of negotiating 
the agreement. 
 The expected benefi ts of the WTO antitrust agreement are further reduced by 
the low-opportunity costs of not cooperating within the WTO. States with exist-
ing, well-functioning antitrust regimes are often able to exercise jurisdiction vis-
à-vis foreign corporations as long as the foreign anticompetitive conduct has an 
effect on their domestic market. 37 States’ ability to resort to extraterritorial 
enforcement makes the case for an international agreement less compelling. 
States can also solve many of the collective action problems through informal 
cooperation mechanisms that are already in place. Numerous bilateral agree-
ments and nonbinding plurilateral and multilateral antitrust regimes have 
enhanced convergence and reduced negative externalities caused by decentral-
ized antitrust enforcement. This further diminishes the need for a binding inter-
national antitrust regime. 38 
 Finally, negotiating a WTO antitrust agreement would be costly, reducing the 
net benefi ts from its success. Contracting costs are particularly high when inter-
national negotiations involve numerous states, distributional tensions, and bur-
densome national ratifi cation procedures. 39 The WTO antitrust negotiations 
would involve 153 governments with heterogeneous preferences, multiple nego-
tiation rounds, and extensive multi-issue bargaining. In addition, domestic rati-
fi cation would presumably be necessary in most member states. Legislative 
approval adds to the contracting costs due to the additional negotiations, delays, 
and risks involved. Contracting costs are further augmented by the WTO enforce-
ment mechanism, which enables member states to enforce potential violations 
of WTO commitments with sanctions. 40 States are expected to research and 
37.  See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993); Joined Cases 
89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission (“Wood 
Pulp”), 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (1988). 
38.  See discussion  infra , Part IV.B.3. 
39.  Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal,  Hard and Soft Law in International Governance , 
54  Int’l Org. 421, 434 (2000) [hereinafter Abbott & Snidal,  Hard and Soft Law ]. 
40.  A violation of a binding international agreement can lead to sanctions (including, 
for instance, bilateral retaliation authorized by the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism) 
or a loss of reputation. While a state might also impose (unauthorized) unilateral trade 
sanctions, an established framework for retaliation within the WTO makes sanctioning 
easier, as a state can withdraw an existing concession and benefi t from the backing of the 
international system that approves the retaliation. Sanctions are therefore more likely to 
be feasible in the case of a breach of a binding WTO commitment. However, loss of repu-
tation can occur when a country breaches a nonbinding agreement just as easily as when 
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negotiate each provision more cautiously when they know that they will face 
sanctions if they breach the agreement. This, obviously, entails higher contract-
ing costs than the less rigorous bargaining associated with nonbinding commit-
ments that lack enforcement. 
 Developing countries’ resistance to WTO antitrust negotiations is illustrative 
of the signifi cance of contracting costs. Developing countries blocked the anti-
trust talks in the 2003 WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun, partially because of 
the high contracting costs involved in the negotiations. Already faced with a high 
burden of regional trade negotiations, 41 developing countries were unwilling to 
pursue yet another binding agreement, particularly since the negotiations of a 
WTO antitrust agreement would have required signifi cant resources and techni-
cal expertise. 42 
 In addition, compliance costs associated with implementing and enforcing 
international antitrust rules would be high, especially for developing countries 
that lack the institutional capacity, technical expertise, and fi nancial resources to 
establish sophisticated antitrust institutions to enforce new laws. The developing 
countries, in particular, would also incur political costs because their import-
competing industries and former state-owned enterprises would resist any 
reforms that would remove the government protection they enjoy. 43 Even if states 
already have antitrust agencies, implementation of international antitrust rules 
involves costs if those rules require states to depart from antitrust laws that 
would be domestically optimal. New laws might also require retraining of anti-
trust enforcers or other similar adjustment expenses. Similarly, corporations 
might incur further costs if they have to revise some of their business practices 
to comply with new antitrust rules. 
it breaches a binding agreement. This might be the case with nonbinding international 
antitrust cooperation, where frequent contacts among antitrust authorities reinforce peer 
pressure for countries to comply with jointly negotiated norms. 
41.  While the WTO negotiations were underway, Caribbean and Latin American coun-
tries were fi nalizing their Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) Agreement; and African, 
Caribbean, and Pacifi c (ACP) countries were still burdened by the aftermath of the 
Cotonou Agreement negotiations with the EU. 
42.  Taimoon Stewart,  The Fate of Competition Policy in Cancun: Politics or Substance? , 31 
 Legal Issues of Econ. Integration 7, 7 (2004);  see Editorial,  The Real Lesson of the Cancun 
Failure ,  Fin. Times (London), Sept. 23, 2003, at 16 (“It is absurd to push, as the EU has 
done, to impose rules in complex areas such as competition and investment on countries 
so poor that some cannot even afford WTO diplomatic representation.”). 
43.  William E. Kovacic,  Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in 
Transition Economies , 23  Brook. J. Int’l L . 403, 404–05 (1997). In contrast, domestic inter-
est groups are not a signifi cant source of resistance to antitrust enforcement in developed 
countries. Instead, they have been inactive in conveying their support for, or resistance of, 
international antitrust rules.  See discussion  infra , Part IV.B.2. 
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 Consequently, while a binding international antitrust agreement would clearly 
create some benefi ts in the form of transactional effi ciencies, those benefi ts are 
trivial when the substantive provisions of the agreement are watered down to 
accommodate states’ divergent preferences and regulatory capacities. The high 
costs of cooperation together with the availability of alternatives further reduce 
the attractiveness of a binding international antitrust agreement. These reasons, 
taken together, explain why states have abandoned the binding antitrust negotia-
tions within the WTO and have turned to other ways to achieve international 
antitrust convergence. 
 iii.  why nonbinding cooperation offers a better pathway 
towards convergence 
 Nonbinding cooperation offers a superior alternative for states seeking interna-
tional antitrust convergence for two primary reasons. First, nonbinding interna-
tional agreements reduce contracting costs and implementation costs that states 
incur while pursuing cooperation. Second, while nonbinding agreements do not 
solve distributional tensions, they permit states to capture some benefi ts from 
cooperation by allowing them to cooperate case-by-case in instances where a 
necessary consensus exists. States are also more willing to enter into nonbinding 
multilateral agreements, knowing that if they later decide to deviate from the 
agreement, they can avoid costly sanctions. 
 Nonbinding international agreements often provide cooperating parties with 
the benefi ts of binding agreements at a lower cost. 44 Cooperation within infor-
mal networks such as the ICN, or targeted case-specifi c enforcement coopera-
tion among a small number of antitrust authorities, involves low contracting 
costs. Negotiations in these venues are more circumscribed and less conten-
tious. 45 The ICN is a largely virtual network that is fl exibly organized around 
working groups. The members of the working groups draft recommendations 
and guidelines, which are then approved by the Network. As the individual anti-
trust authorities remain free to decide whether and how to implement the rec-
ommendations domestically, the process of approving such recommendations is 
unlikely to involve rigorous bargaining. Nonbinding recommendations also 
allow antitrust agencies to seek international convergence without involving the 
legislators, which diminishes costs and delays embedded in the domestic ratifi -
cation process. 
44.  Abbott & Snidal,  Hard and Soft Law ,  supra note 39, at 434. 
45.  Anne-Marie Slaughter,  The Accountability of Government Networks , 8  Ind. L. Global 
Legal Stud . 347, 347 (2001). Even though the ICN involves multiple parties with diver-
gent preferences, the promulgation of nonbinding norms within the Network can be 
described as being “fast, fl exible, and effective.” 
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 However, critics may argue that nonbinding cooperation is more costly than 
negotiating an antitrust agreement through the WTO. Non-binding antitrust 
cooperation today consists of numerous bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral 
governance instruments, all focusing only on some subset of substantive or pro-
cedural antitrust matters. These multiple non-binding instruments, taken 
together, could be costlier than a single binding international antitrust agree-
ment, provided that such an agreement was feasible to reach. 
 However, there are a number of reasons a WTO antitrust agreement probably 
involves higher contracting costs, even when compared to the aggregate costs of 
negotiating a myraid of nonbinding agreements. For instance, the pursuit of 
multiple nonbinding agreements has an important advantage of allowing a 
“cherry-picked” solution, where parties can choose to cooperate only on those 
issues where the net benefi ts of cooperation are the greatest. While the absence 
of (aggregate) net gains can delay or prohibit an entire binding international 
agreement — including the contemplated WTO antitrust agreement — the multi-
tude of nonbinding agreements renders cooperation possible in those matters 
and among those parties where the benefi ts exceed the costs of cooperation. 46 
Also, risk-adjusted contracting costs are signifi cantly higher when states pursue 
a binding, nearly universal agreement. The possibility that the parties will fail to 
reach an agreement on a specifi c issue within the ICN, for instance, is less costly 
than the possibility that the WTO negotiations will fail to successfully conclude 
after years of intense bargaining. Thus, while the  ex post costs of a single, all-
embracing and successfully concluded binding international antitrust agree-
ment could be lower, states’  ex ante risk-adjusted perception of those costs is 
signifi cantly higher. 
 Compliance costs for developing countries are likely to be signifi cant regard-
less of whether they enact domestic antitrust laws and set up enforcement mech-
anisms under binding or nonbinding international agreements. However, 
nonbinding agreements are likely to be more attractive in that they allow devel-
oping countries to adopt only those international norms that involve relatively 
low compliance costs. 47 Nonbinding cooperation is also likely to reduce political 
46.  This particular advantage also explains why states have pursued extensive bilateral 
cooperation.  See discussion  supra the chapter, pp.322–324 (Section I). 
47.  However, developing countries might be able to negotiate fl exible provisions even 
if states choose to pursue a binding agreement under the auspices of the WTO. While the 
WTO is built on the idea that all its agreements apply equally to all WTO members, the 
WTO principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” occasionally permits 
developing countries to enjoy more limited obligations or more generous implementation 
timeframes.  See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone,  Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in 
International Law , 98  Am. J. Int’l L . 276 (2004). 
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costs stemming from the domestic resistance of international antitrust rules by 
decreasing the visibility and the prominence of the international commitments. 
 Nonbinding agreements do not remove distributional tensions among states. 
However, they often ease bargaining problems by granting more fl exibility 
regarding the manner and the extent to which states implement international 
antitrust commitments domestically. 48 Pursuing a myriad of nonbinding coop-
eration agreements allows states to limit cooperation to parties that maintain 
similar preferences or to issues where consensus exists. 
 States are also likely to prefer nonbinding agreements because the conse-
quences of a breach are less severe. States with capacity constraints or confl icting 
preferences have a marginal ability, or willingness, to comply with any negoti-
ated commitments. They are therefore more likely to join a regime under which 
they can defect without facing sanctions. Thus, by keeping international com-
mitments nonbinding, states are able to capture some gains from international 
cooperation without relinquishing control over their domestic antitrust laws, or 
assuming the risk of sanctions if they are ultimately unable or unwilling to 
comply with their obligations. 49 
 iv.  do nonbinding agreements pave the way for a binding 
international antitrust agreement? 
 The above discussion has argued that a meaningful binding international anti-
trust agreement would currently be infeasible to negotiate, and explained why 
nonbinding agreements can still be effective in fostering cooperation. This Part 
extends the claim by asserting that even if binding multilateral cooperation were 
to become more viable in the future (predominantly due to the gradual align-
ment of state preferences as a result of voluntary cooperation), states will con-
tinue to rely on nonbinding cooperation in the near future. 
 A.  Conventional Wisdom: Nonbinding Agreements Form a Second-Best Solution 
 Among international law scholars, there is often a presumption that binding 
international agreements, if attainable, would be superior tools to generate regu-
latory convergence. States are assumed to resort to nonbinding agreements 
48.  See also Abbott & Snidal,  Hard and Soft Law ,  supra note 39, at 445. Abbott and 
Snidal suggest that “soft law should be attractive in proportion to the degree of divergence 
among the preferences and capacities of states.” 
49.  In contrast, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism would authorize trading 
partners to retaliate if one party failed to comply with a potential WTO Antitrust 
Agreement. 
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when normatively more desirable binding agreements are not available. 50 Many 
commentators also argue that the greatest virtue of nonbinding agreements is 
their potential to pave the way for binding cooperation. 51 Under this view, non-
binding agreements are considered to form merely a stepping stone in a gradual 
process towards the ultimate goal: a binding international agreement. 
 International cooperation may evolve gradually from lower to higher levels of 
cooperation. 52 States may initially enter into modest cooperative arrangements 
that are more viable to negotiate. 53 Those arrangements might then incremen-
tally evolve into binding international agreements, as uncertainty progressively 
diminishes and consensus among states begins to emerge. Constructivist schol-
ars in particular support this theory of incremental norm formation. They argue 
that social interaction, diffusion of information, and collective deliberation 
within nonbinding regimes trigger a “self-reinforcing dynamic,” which leads 
states to pursue deeper and more formal means of cooperation. 54 
 Historically, the proponents of a nonbinding international antitrust regime 
have endorsed such a regime primarily on the grounds that it is more  feasible to 
attain than a binding international agreement. Nonbinding cooperation is fre-
quently viewed as the “best available” regime, implying that a binding interna-
tional agreement would represent the optimal solution, if it were attainable. 
Diane Wood, one of the leading proponents of nonbinding international antitrust 
cooperation, has aptly summarized this view by calling a binding international 
50.  Steven R. Ratner,  Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Confl ict? , 32 
 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 591, 653 (2000) (noting the implicit assumption that hard law 
affects state behavior more than soft law);  see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, 
 International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach , 44  Va. J. Int’l L. 113, 114 (2003) 
(noting that among traditional, positivistic approaches to international law, “nonlegal” 
instruments are viewed as being of secondary importance). 
51.  See, e.g., Christine Chinkin , Normative Development in the International Legal System, 
in  Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Bonding Norms in the 
International Legal System 21, 32 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (noting that soft law can 
act as a catalyst for the development of customary international law, which to many com-
mentators is the “ raison d’être of soft law”). 
52.  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal,  Pathways to International Cooperatio n ,  in 
 The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation 50, 50 (Eyal 
Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004). 
53.  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal,  Filling in the Folk Theorem: The Role of 
Gradualism and Legalization in International Cooperation to Combat Corruption 1–2 ( Aug. 
30, 2002) (working paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual 
meeting). 
54.  Id. at 12.  See also Abbott & Snidal,  Pathways to International Cooperation, supra  note 
56; Downs et al.,  Transformational Model, supra note 36, at 467 n.2 (referring to literature 
that represents the Transformationalist perspective). 
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antitrust agreement an “impossible dream.” 55 A binding agreement is regarded 
as the ultimate goal and nonbinding cooperation as a pathway towards that goal. 56 
While some independent benefi ts of nonbinding cooperation have been acknowl-
edged in the debate, most advocates of nonbinding international antitrust law see 
it only as a second-best, partial, or interim solution. 57 
 It is possible that nonbinding antitrust cooperation will pave the way for bind-
ing international antitrust rules. Voluntary cooperation facilitates information 
exchange, learning, and trust-building among antitrust authorities. As a result, 
state preferences are expected to become more aligned, alleviating the distribu-
tional tensions that currently undermine cooperation. In addition, the costs of 
negotiating a legally binding agreement are prone to diminish, as states would 
no longer need to adjust their domestic laws signifi cantly (as the domestic equi-
librium would be closer to that sought by an international agreement). Such 
developments would likely remove, or at least mitigate, obstacles to the binding 
international antitrust agreement. 
 This view suggests that as binding cooperation becomes more feasible, states 
may attempt to revive negotiations toward a binding international antitrust 
agreement, within or outside the WTO framework. This raises the question 
whether negotiating a binding agreement is indeed the optimal path or whether 
a nonbinding international antitrust regime is preferable even when the alterna-
tive of binding cooperation becomes more viable. 
 B.  Disputing the Presumed Supremacy of Binding Agreements 
 This article argues that a pathway from nonbinding to binding rules in antitrust 
cooperation is not inevitable, nor is it even likely. “Nations cooperate without law 
all the time,” 58 and they do so for a reason. Nonbinding agreements have their 
own, independent advantages and are sometimes more optimal governance 
55.  Diane P. Wood,  The  Impossible Dream : Real International  Antitrust , 1992  U. Chi. 
Legal F . 277, 300–01 (1992). 
56.  See Wood,  supra note 6, at 179, 185–185 (“[W]e need to exercise caution before we 
take a leap into a formal antitrust regime”; “A slower approach . . . was the better way 
toward our ultimate goal”; and “I believe that harmonization is, at this time, prema-
ture”). 
57.  Id. See also, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller,  The Internationalization of Antitrust 
Enforcement , 77 B.U. L. Rev. 343, 402 (1997) (“Cooperation is a valuable addition to the 
antitrust landscape, but not as an alternative to harmonization or a particularly valuable 
end unto itself.”); Wolfgang Kerber & Oliver Budzinski,  Competition of Competition Laws: 
Mission Impossible? ,  in  Competition Laws in Confl ict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the 
Global Economy ,  supra note 4, at 31 (supporting nonbinding cooperation on the grounds 
of retaining fl exibility and allowing for parallel experimentation and mutual learning). 
However, Kerber and Budzinski also endorse supplementing nonbinding cooperation in 
cross-border antitrust matters with binding international jurisdictional rules. 
58.  See Goldsmith & Posner,  supra note 54, at 116. 
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instruments than binding agreements. 59 States choose between binding and 
nonbinding agreements in accordance with their interest in any given issue, 
taking into account the constraints imposed by other states and the external envi-
ronment in which they operate. Nonbinding agreements do not merely “come to 
the rescue” when legally binding regimes are not attainable. 60 Rather, binding 
and nonbinding agreements offer distinct benefi ts, the relative importance of 
which depends on the strategic situation of the states pursuing cooperation. 
 Nonbinding international antitrust cooperation avoids the problem of water-
ing down the rules to accommodate divergent preferences. Nonbinding coopera-
tion also offers more fl exibility and reduces contracting and implementation 
costs associated with cooperation. A shift to binding cooperation would cause 
states to lose those important benefi ts. In addition, the specifi c advantages of 
binding agreements are of no real value to the negotiating parties for three pri-
mary reasons. First, assuming that antitrust laws are rarely used opportunisti-
cally for protectionist purposes, there is no need to pursue a binding agreement 
with enforcement provisions. Second, in the absence of coherent interests group 
support for far-reaching international antitrust cooperation, a binding agree-
ment does not offer political economy gains. Finally, evolving nonbinding 
regimes are pre-capturing the highest gains of cooperation and thereby gradu-
ally decreasing the net benefi ts from the pursuit of a binding agreement. 
 1.  The Self-Enforcing Nature of Antitrust Cooperation Renders a Binding 
Agreement Unnecessary  The risk of opportunism is one of the key variables 
that states consider when choosing between binding and nonbinding agree-
ments. 61 Binding international agreements with cautiously negotiated commit-
ments are less susceptible to states’ self-serving interpretation. 62 Binding 
agreements raise the costs of noncompliance; cheating is easier and possibly 
more prevalent with nonbinding agreements. 63 Thus, binding agreements seem 
advantageous as “assurance devices” in situations where the potential for costly 
opportunism is high and cheating is diffi cult to detect. 64 
59.  Abbott & Snidal,  Hard and Soft Law ,  supra note 39, at 423 (“[S]oft law offers many 
advantages of hard law, avoids some costs of hard law, and has certain advantages of its 
own”);  id. at 456 (arguing that soft law is valuable on its own, and not just as a stepping 
stone to hard law). 
60.  Jan Klabbers,  The  Undesirability of Soft Law , 67  Nordic J. Int’l Law 381, 384 
(1998). 
61.  Kal Raustiala,  Form and Substance in International Agreements , 99  Am. J. Int’l L. 
581, 593–94 (2005). 
62.  Abbott & Snidal,  Hard and Soft Law ,  supra note 39, at 426–27. 
63.  The costs of reneging can manifest themselves both in the form of reputational 
costs or actual enforcement costs, for instance, in case of WTO dispute settlement.  See id. 
at 427. 
64.  Id. at 429. 
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 Binding agreements make sense in some contexts. For example, binding 
agreements are required as assurance devices most prominently in the national 
security domain, where any defection from cooperation would be particularly 
dangerous. Also, international trade matters are susceptible to opportunism. 
States seek enhanced market access for their exports but are at the same time 
tempted to renege on their own commitments to reciprocally open their domes-
tic markets to foreign imports. These types of cooperation problems are charac-
terized as Prisoner’s Dilemmas where the central problem is the states’ pervasive 
incentive to defect from any agreement they negotiate. In contrast, when the 
incentives to defect from the agreed commitments are low, a binding agreement 
with enforceable commitments is less valuable. This is the case in coordination 
games where the parties lack the incentives to deviate from the agreement once 
the focal point of coordination has been established. 65 
 I have elsewhere argued that the strategic situation underlying international 
antitrust cooperation resembles predominantly a coordination game with distri-
butional consequences. 66 States would like to coordinate their antitrust policies 
but cannot agree on the optimal rules around which to converge. 67 For instance, 
while the United States would prefer all countries to enforce U.S.-style antitrust 
laws, the EU would rather see all countries enforce EU-style antitrust laws. 
This distributional confl ict makes international antitrust cooperation diffi cult. 
However, if states were to agree on the optimal point of antitrust convergence, 
the agreement would be self-enforcing, as none of the states would have the 
incentive to deviate from the agreed rules. 68 This would render the enforcement 
65.  Raustiala,  Form and Substance ,  supra note 66, at 592–94.  See also Kenneth W. Abbott, 
 Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers , 14  Yale J. 
Int’l L. 335, 358–62, 371–74 (1989). While the possibility of defection is not entirely absent 
in coordination situations, any surreptitious cheating at least is unlikely.  See Lisa L. Martin, 
 The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism, in  Multilateralism Matters: The Theory 
and Praxis of an Institutional Form 91, 102 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1993). 
66.  See generally Bradford,  supra note 3. 
67.  The efforts to coordinate merger policies or cartel investigations among antitrust 
agencies, for instance, are unlikely to involve incentives to engage in noncooperative strat-
egies and cheating. States can generally be expected to benefi t from a more effective con-
trol of international cartels that adversely affect several markets. Similarly, harmonized 
merger control procedures enhancing legal certainty and reducing transaction costs and 
delays should generate aggregate and individual benefi ts that would only be undermined 
by choosing noncooperative strategies. For instance, neither the United States nor the EU 
would benefi t from an inconsistent merger review decision between the two agencies, 
even though both states can be expected to want the other state to reach the same decision 
that they have reached.  Id ., pp. 514–16. 
68.  However, China’s fi rst enforcement decisions under its newly adopted antimo-
nopoly law offer some indication that antitrust review could be used as a vehicle for 
protectionism, possibly calling into question the characterization of international anti-
trust cooperation as a coordination game (as opposed to a Prisoner’s Dilemma). China’s 
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mechanism of any legally binding antitrust agreement less attractive, if not 
altogether unnecessary. 69 
 While deliberate cheating is likely to be rare in the antitrust domain, develop-
ing countries’ capacity constraints, including a lack of enforcement institutions 
and antirust expertise, might lead to occasional defections from international 
commitments. However, to the extent that states’ defections can be traced to 
capacity constraints rather than to an intentional violation of the agreement, a 
binding agreement with enforcement provisions would be unlikely to bring 
about greater compliance. Capacity building in the form of technical assistance 
is likely to yield better results vis-à-vis developing countries whose inadequate 
regulatory capacities renders compliance with the contemplated agreement dif-
fi cult. The “managerial model of compliance,” which rests on transparency, 
capacity building, and persuasion, rather than on enforcement and sanctions, 70 
seems therefore particularly suitable for ratcheting up antitrust standards in the 
developing countries. 
 Consequently, if the major obstacle to an international antitrust agreement is 
not the diffi culty of ensuring compliance, but the diffi culty of reaching an agree-
ment in the fi rst place due to the distributional problem, the enforcement ben-
efi ts of binding agreements are limited. This is likely to cause states to prefer 
decision to prohibit Coca Cola’s proposed acquisition of the Chinese juice company 
Huyian, for instance, raised suspicions on the motivations behind China’s antitrust policy. 
The possibility of China becoming a major antitrust force that repeatedly applies its anti-
trust laws strategically to block the market entry of foreign companies might underline 
the limits of voluntary cooperation. However, it is uncertain whether China’s antitrust 
practices can revive the WTO antitrust negotiations. It is too soon to argue that China’s 
early antitrust enforcement practices have fundamentally amended the strategic situation 
underlying international antitrust cooperation. It is also unclear whether China’s enforce-
ment patterns will prompt the United States and other states currently opposing WTO 
antitrust rules to change their minds on the benefi ts of such rules. Second, any WTO 
antitrust agreement aimed to constrain China’s antitrust policies would require China’s 
acquiescence on those new rules, complicating the negotiations. 
69.  Charles Lipson has argued that the distinction between enforceable and nonenforce-
able commitments is largely moot in international law, which lacks the enforcement mech-
anisms comparable to those embedded in domestic legal systems. Contrasting international 
and domestic enforcement structures does indeed highlight the weaknesses of the interna-
tional legal system. However, this distinction is somewhat less pronounced with respect to 
areas of international trade law that are supported by the WTO dispute settlement mecha-
nism. The dispute settlement mechanism provides for multilaterally authorized (yet bilat-
erally executed) retaliatory measures. Thus, the question of enforcement remains a relevant 
consideration when states choose between a binding WTO agreement on antitrust and, for 
instance, nonbinding ICN guidelines and recommendations.  See discussion in Lipson, 
 Why Are Some International Agreements  Informal? 45  Int’l Org. 495, 502–08, 513 (1991). 
70.  Abraham Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes , On Compliance, 47  Int’l Org. 
175, 197–204 (1993). 
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nonbinding agreements even in a situation where a binding agreement is 
assumed to be more feasible to attain. 
 2.  A Binding Agreement Does Not Offer Political Economy Gains  The choice 
between a binding and nonbinding international agreement is also informed by 
domestic political economy considerations. 71 Binding agreements emerge in 
areas where domestic interest groups are active. Interest groups that favor inter-
national cooperation in a given issue area generally support binding agreements 
because of their perceived effectiveness. 72 Binding agreements also offer the 
domestic constituency more opportunities to infl uence the content of the agree-
ment, as their conclusion generally requires more domestic legislative involve-
ment. In contrast, nonbinding cooperation mechanisms are common in the 
complex areas of “technocratic cooperation,” including antitrust, where domestic 
interest groups are less active. 73 
 There is no evidence that domestic interest groups, including consumers, 
corporations, or industry organizations, would deem an international antitrust 
agreement a priority. 74 Consumers, who would be expected to benefi t from 
enhanced international antitrust enforcement, form a fragmented interest group 
with little agenda-setting capacity. 75 Corporations, on the other hand, have inter-
ests that are largely case- and issue-specifi c, rendering  ex ante support for any 
comprehensive international antitrust agreement diffi cult. For example, a corpo-
ration will probably support international cooperation to ensure a smooth clear-
ance of a merger in which it is participating, but may have contrary interests 
when its competitors are seeking to merge. Similarly, the corporation’s support 
for international cooperation in cartel matters is likely to hinge on whether agen-
cies are seeking to prosecute a cartel in which the corporation itself, or its com-
petitors, are participating. 76 Thus, corporations prefer to choose case-by-case the 
71.  Raustiala,  Form and Substance ,  supra note 65, at 582. 
72.  Id. at 600. 
73.  Id. 
74.  See, e.g. ,  ICC/BIAC Comments on Report of the U.S. International Competition Policy 
Advisory Committee ,  supra note 12, at 2, 6, 10. While the ICC and the BIAC support some 
degree of substantive and some procedural harmonization and convergence of domestic 
merger regimes, “ICC and BIAC agree that the WTO is not an appropriate forum for 
review of private restraints and that the WTO should not develop new competition laws 
under its framework at this time.” 
75.  International antitrust cooperation has not been a priority for consumer organiza-
tions either, which might be explained by the “technocratic” nature of antitrust law.  See 
Raustiala,  Form and Substance ,  supra note 65, at 600. 
76.  In general, while corporations tend to defi ne their interests case-by-case, they are 
expected to support cooperation in the case of merger reviews, as this would reduce trans-
action costs and uncertainty. In contrast, corporations often resist rules that facilitate 
cooperation in cartel cases, out of fear of one day being the target of a cartel investigation. 
 See ABA & I nt’l Bar Assoc., A Tax on Mergers?: Surveying the Time and Costs to 
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issues and instances in which they want antitrust agencies to cooperate among 
themselves. 
 In the absence of coherent domestic interest group support, states are able to 
reap few political gains by pursuing a binding international antitrust agree-
ment. 77 As a result, states prefer to focus on other regulatory priorities, leaving 
international antitrust cooperation to the domain of antitrust agencies. 78 This 
has caused international antitrust cooperation to be primarily an agency-driven 
regulatory process. Most antitrust agencies operate relatively independently 
from the executive and the legislature. Nonbinding international cooperation 
further strengthens their independence and expands their regulatory powers. 79 It 
is therefore not surprising that antitrust agencies have been the principal  norm 
entrepreneurs behind the pursuit of international antitrust cooperation. 80 And as 
long as the demand for international antitrust cooperation continues to stem 
from the agencies rather than from domestic interests groups or the legislature, 
nonbinding cooperation is likely to persist. 
 3.  Nonbinding Agreements Reduce the Gains Available from a Binding 
Agreement  Today, a growing number of jurisdictions enforce increasingly 
Business of Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Reviews 5 (June 2003) (noting that 56 per-
cent of the businesses see scope for improving and harmonizing merger notifi cation pro-
cesses);  see also ICC/BIAC Comments on Report of the U.S. International Competition Policy 
Advisory Committee ,  supra note 12, at 8. 
77.  The absence of interest group support is one reason countries have had diffi culty 
negotiating a binding international antitrust agreement. By contrast, countries success-
fully concluded the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPs”) largely as a result of intense lobbying by domestic corporations in the 
United States, the EU, and Japan.  See Sylvia Ostry,  Convergence and Sovereignty: Policy Scope 
for Compromise? ,  in  Coping with Globalization 52, 55–57 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. 
Hart eds., 2000);  see also Bradford,  supra note 3, at 547–48. (discussing why the prospects 
for formal cooperation in the case of the TRIPs and antitrust have been different). 
78.  “States” are in this connection understood as elected offi cials, including the legis-
lature and the executive. 
79.  Antitrust enforcers rarely need to consult other government agencies or the legis-
lature when pursuing nonbinding cooperation directly with their counterparts abroad. A 
nonbinding international regime that exclusively focuses on antitrust matters also empow-
ers antitrust agencies vis-à-vis other government agencies. For example, a binding WTO 
antitrust agreement would shift powers from the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department 
of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR), whereas cooperation under the auspices of the ICN would allow 
antitrust agencies to retain all decision-making powers. This is probably one reason the 
USTR has endorsed incorporating antitrust in the WTO while the DOJ and FTC have 
opposed it.  See Spencer Weber Waller,  National Laws and International Markets: Strategies 
of Cooperation and Harmonization in the Enforcement of Competition Law , 18  Cardozo L. 
Rev. 1111, 1122–24 (1996). 
80.  The attempts to generate cooperation in any international forum — whether in the 
WTO, ICN, or OECD — have been predominantly driven by antitrust agencies. 
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consistent antitrust laws. Approximately one hundred states have domestic anti-
trust laws, all of which were enacted without any binding international obliga-
tion to do so. 81 In addition to the rapid proliferation of new antitrust regimes, the 
existing antitrust laws are moving closer to one another. 82 Antitrust norms and 
economic theories behind them have diffused rapidly across jurisdictions as 
countries have emulated more established antitrust regimes. 83 
 A large part of this predominantly voluntary adoption of antitrust rules and 
their increasing alignment may be attributed to the market-based diffusion of 
neo-liberal economic ideology and increasing domestic support for privatization 
and liberalization of trade and investment, even in developing countries and 
transition economies. 84 In addition, existing bilateral cooperation and nonbind-
ing multilateral antitrust norms have accelerated this diffusion of antitrust norms 
across the globe, further contributing to international antitrust convergence. 
 While it is diffi cult to determine the extent to which existing convergence 
refl ects nonbinding international rules on the one hand, and other motivations 
on the other, the very fact that convergence is taking place has two implications. 
First, increasing voluntary alignment of domestic antitrust laws ought to allevi-
ate the distributional problem that has thus far undermined any efforts to 
negotiate a binding international antitrust agreement. Voluntary convergence is 
also likely to decrease the adjustment cost of cooperation. When domestic anti-
trust laws increasingly begin to resemble one another, commitments sought 
by a binding international agreement would not require states to undertake 
81.  See  http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org (last visited May 24, 2010) (maintain-
ing a list of existing antitrust laws across the world). 
82.  See, e.g., Fox,  supra note 4, at 1787 (discussing cross-fertilization of antitrust laws, 
which has produced “increasingly high levels of common understanding”). 
83.  The existing international convergence has taken place largely around the U.S. or 
the EU antitrust regimes, resulting in two “clusters” of antitrust systems instead of a 
single  de facto harmonized global antitrust regime. While the bipolar antitrust conver-
gence is to some extent the result of a voluntary decision on the part of new antitrust 
regimes to emulate the two more developed regimes, the existing convergence also refl ects 
a conscious effort by the United States and the EU to actively export their respective anti-
trust regimes abroad. On market-based harmonization that occurs when countries have 
an incentive to emulate more established regulatory regimes, see Beth A. Simmons,  The 
 International Politics of Harmonization : The Case of Capital Market Regulation , 55  Int’l 
Org. 589 (2001). 
84.  For the most part, the creation of antitrust laws in developing countries does not 
appear to refl ect an externally induced policy change. However, it is diffi cult to estimate 
the extent to which developing countries adopt antitrust laws out of self-interest and the 
extent to which they are pressured to conform to the preferences of the powerful antitrust 
regimes.  See, e.g.,  Susan K. Sell ,  Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of 
Intellectual Property and Antitrust (1998) (characterizing developing countries’ 
decisions to implement antitrust laws as a “choice within constraints rather than coer-
cion”). 
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substantial new commitments. This would decrease contracting costs and com-
pliance costs alike, and increase the likelihood that even formal cooperation 
would gradually become net benefi cial. The second implication is that the ongo-
ing voluntary convergence is gradually eroding the benefi ts of binding coopera-
tion. The voluntary alignment of domestic antitrust laws reduces negative 
externalities embedded in the current system, which decreases the need for 
binding international rules. In such circumstances, the added value from seek-
ing to codify the status quo becomes questionable. 
 While it is diffi cult to predict whether the benefi ts or the costs of cooperation 
are likely to fall at a faster rate following voluntary convergence, it is likely that 
net benefi ts from cooperation are gradually shrinking. Existing voluntary coop-
eration focuses on issues where net benefi ts are the greatest and distributional 
tensions most manageable; any remaining binding agreement would be left to 
address a range of issues with lower prospective benefi ts. As the pursuit of a 
binding agreement must entail some level of fi xed costs (in particular, contract-
ing costs), a dwindling pool of available net benefi ts will likely reduce the incen-
tive to pursue a binding agreement. 
 Accordingly, as long as (1) international antitrust cooperation continues to be 
largely self-enforcing and opportunistic behavior an exception, (2) domestic 
interest group support for international antirust cooperation continues to be 
weak, and (3) nonbinding antitrust convergence continues to expand and show 
progress in mitigating negative externalities, states are likely to continue to rely 
on nonbinding agreements when pursuing antitrust cooperation. Nonbinding 
instruments may gradually develop toward binding antitrust commitments, but 
that is not inevitable. Nor is the move toward a binding international antitrust 
agreement necessarily a desirable one as long as the fundamental assumptions 
described above continue to hold. 
 conclusion 
 This article has argued that the pursuit of nonbinding international antitrust 
cooperation represents an optimal choice for states. It is not merely an opportu-
nity to capture limited gains from cooperation while proceeding towards a bind-
ing international agreement, as is commonly perceived. 
 States’ confl icting preferences over the optimal content of international 
antitrust cooperation is the primary impediment for negotiating binding anti-
trust rules in the WTO. States have sought to accommodate their divergent pref-
erences by removing controversial issues from the negotiation agenda. However, 
this has led to proposals for watered-down rules that would confer trivial benefi ts 
to WTO member states. Because states expect low net benefi ts from a prospec-
tive WTO antitrust agreement, states have abandoned the negotiations to seek 
case-by-case cooperation and voluntary international guidelines instead. 
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 Nonbinding cooperation has successfully fostered international antitrust con-
vergence. A growing number of states enforce increasingly consistent antitrust 
rules today without any binding international agreement requiring them to do 
so. Eventually, successful voluntary convergence could pave the way for binding 
cooperation. However, this article has argued that nonbinding agreements are 
likely to persist for three primary reasons. First, as cooperation under nonbind-
ing agreements is largely self-enforcing, the added value of a binding agreement 
with provisions for monitoring, enforcement, and sanctions is trivial. Second, in 
the absence of coordinated domestic interest group support for international 
antitrust cooperation, a binding agreement would not provide states with any 
domestic political economy rents and therefore will remain a low national prior-
ity. Finally, the emerging voluntary convergence will slowly eradicate negative 
externalities stemming from decentralized antitrust regimes, making the case 
for a binding international agreement less compelling. 
 By arguing that nonbinding agreements are preferable to binding agree-
ments, even in situations where binding agreements are feasible, this article 
disputes the view that nonbinding agreements are second-best instruments for 
fostering international antitrust convergence. States have not chosen nonbind-
ing agreements because their fi rst-best regime choice has been unavailable. 
Instead, states have viewed binding agreements as unnecessary and undesir-
able. 
 An optimal institutional design must be consistent with state interests to be 
effective. By acknowledging both the diffi culties involved in the pursuit of bind-
ing international antitrust cooperation and the ability of nonbinding agreements 
to mitigate those diffi culties, this article raises two critical questions. First, given 
the obstacles to international antitrust cooperation, how could a binding agree-
ment emerge? And second, assuming that a binding agreement could emerge, 
what would it add to the existing nonbinding international antitrust regime? 
Until the proponents of a binding international antitrust agreement can answer 
those questions, nonbinding cooperation is, and will likely remain, the preferred 
solution. 
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